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TRIBUTES TO JUDGE RITA C. DAVIDSON
ROSALYN B. BELL*
When the Honorable Rita Charmatz Davidson entered a room
or a courtroom, everyone knew she was there. Her presence caught
one's attention, not so much because of her physical stature, but
because of the intensity of her thoughts and purposes. Rita David-
son's achievements opened many doors for women in the legal field,
yet she kept her accomplishments in perspective and did not hesi-
tate to applaud the success of other women. Her dedication to
every challenge remained strong even when her stance met with
opposition.
The series of Rita Davidson's "firsts" began in 1967, when she
became the first person to serve as a zoning hearing examiner for
Montgomery County, Maryland. In 1970 she moved on, becoming
the first woman to serve in the governor's cabinet as Secretary of the
Department of Employment and Social Services. Two years later,
she began her judicial career, sitting on the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland from 1972 to 1979, and joining the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland in 1979. Judge Davidson was the first woman to
serve on either of these appellate courts.
It is significant to note, however, that Rita Davidson's accom-
plishments extended far beyond her achievement of these many
"firsts." Her concern for the underdog and the disadvantaged did
not wane despite lack of support for her position. In fact, Judge
Davidson was known for submitting numerous dissenting opinions
during her judicial career. Although she often became disheartened
by the frequency with which she felt the need to indicate disagree-
ment with the majority, Rita Davidson believed in her views and
* Associate Judge, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
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continued to express them. While perhaps having no discernable
effect initially, Judge Davidson's dissents often anticipated imminent
changes in the law.
One such opinion of which she was particularly proud, Sard v.
Hardy,' concerned the informed consent doctrine. The case in-
volved a woman who, after two difficult pregnancies and births by
caesarian section, became pregnant a third time. A few weeks
before giving birth, her physician advised her against future
pregnancies and made several suggestions concerning birth control
methods. Relying upon the physician's representation that tubal li-
gation would guarantee sterility, the woman chose to undergo the
operation. The surgery was performed immediately after the third
caesarian section.
Despite this operation, the woman became pregnant again and
filed suit against her physician for malpractice. She alleged that the
physician had failed to inform her that tubal ligation did not always
prevent pregnancy, and that the physician had not informed her of
all the alternatives to the surgical procedure. The Circuit Court for
Talbot County directed a verdict in favor of the physician, and the
majority of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
Judge Davidson, then an Associate Judge on the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals, argued strongly in her dissent that the issue should
have been submitted to the jury.2 Emphasizing the relationship be-
tween a physician and patient asone based on trust and confidence,
she explained that a physician has "an obligation to disclose to the
patient all material facts reasonably necessary to provide the basis of
an informed intelligent decision as to a proposed treatment."
3
Judge Davidson concluded that the information given Mrs. Sard was
insufficient to make an informed decision, and stated that it was sig-
nificant that there was "one chance in fifty that [a patient] would
derive no benefit from the operation."4
Judge Davidson's view was adopted by the Court of Appeals,
which held "the scope of the physician's duty to inform is to be mea-
sured by the materiality of the information to the decision of the
patient."5 The court further noted that the evidence "taken to-
gether, was sufficient in this sterilization case to warrant submission
to the jury the question whether the information withheld . . .was
1. 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976).
2. Id. at 239, 367 A.2d at 538 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 247-48, 367 A.2d at 542 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 253, 367 A.2d at 545 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
5. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 444, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977).
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material to the patient's decision." 6
While the Sard case illustrates Judge Davidson's role in effecting
change in the law by speaking contrary to the majority, there were
also times when she did not meet with such success. For example,
Rita Davidson repeatedly declined to uphold death penalty
sentences, and often received criticism for her attempts to safeguard
the rights of criminal defendants. Despite the frequent unpopular-
ity of her views, she did not retreat; she remained a forceful advo-
cate of ideas in which she believed. Rita Davidson refused to accept
a principle or rationale simply because the majority did. Each deci-
sion had to be appropriate, both in the particular case and in her
view of future ramifications.
Judge Davidson's refusal to abandon the fight to protect the
rights of the powerless and disadvantaged was more important than
her many "firsts." Perhaps this persistence is her greatest legacy.
6. Id. at 446, 379 A.2d at 1023.
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KAREN CZAPANSKIY*
I met Judge Davidson one evening twelve years ago when she
interviewed me for the position of law clerk. It was a serendipitous
event: she, just appointed to the Court of Special Appeals, was
seeking a clerk; I was seeking a clerkship. Actually, as I was soon to
discover, she wanted a legal and personal aide-de-camp. During my
clerkship, I worked on her cases as all clerks do for all judges. I also
drove her to court, to campaign appearances, and to her dog's ken-
nel. We shopped together for her clothes; I kept her in cigarettes,
snacks and lunches; and I sewed hems in her dresses. She needed a
clerk in January, in the middle of my last year of law school. So I
changed my schedule, delayed some courses until the following
summer, took the bar exam six months late, and commuted the long
distance to work in a twelve-year-old car. What made it worthwhile
was simple: Rita Davidson.
From our first meeting, I understood that the Judge was
unique, special, perhaps larger than life. In time I learned that she
had always been a groundbreaker, starting at least as early as her
days at Goucher where she battled the gym requirement. She was
the first zoning hearing examiner for Montgomery County. She was
the first woman to sit in the cabinet of a governor of Maryland. She
was the first woman appointed to any appellate bench in the history
of Maryland. And then she was the first to serve on its highest court.
But I do not think her uniqueness came solely from her titles. I
think it came instead from her abundant enthusiasm for people and
from her integrity.
For Rita Davidson, the substance of life was people. She cared
for people, cared about people, cared with people. Her dedication
to the law was founded on the principle that the law serves people.
Her initial test of the correctness of a legal rule was whether it
benefitted people. To the Judge, a rule that denied people compas-
sion and fairness was suspect.
Along with her other law clerks, I was often the subject of the
Judge's interest in people. My position was not always comfortable.
When she found my research, analysis, or expression deficient, she
would say so. Her criticism of my work was purely that, however; it
was never personal. She respected me just as I respected her.
When she engaged another's mind, she always expected to learn
and to grow.
The Judge let every person's humanness touch her. That per-
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.
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son may have been more or less brilliant, more or less honest, more
or less noteworthy, but that person was never less than a person.
Instinctively, she followed the dictates of the philosopher
Maimonedes, who said that the best form of charity is to make it
possible for another person to be autonomous. A person in trouble
is not an object of pity, but someone whose full potential has not
been realized. Judge Davidson showed unstinting respect for
human potential. As her clerk, I was a new, untested lawyer with
much to learn, but to Judge Rita Davidson I was a person, and there-
fore full of potential. Her respect inspired me and many others to
realize our potential and gain autonomy.
A typical experience with the Judge started one day when, as
usual, we were working while the rest of the world was on vacation.
The phone rang; it was my husband telling me that our apartment
was on fire and he had just escaped. I informed the Judge, who
replied, "I love a fire! Let's go." So we went home to watch the
fire. By the time the morning was over, my husband and I were
without a home. "No problem," said the Judge; "come to my
house." So we did, along with our three cats and my charred bar
review notes. We stayed until after the bar exam, several weeks
later. Somehow, with Rita, it just seemed the most natural thing in
the world for me to be living in her house and studying for the bar
exam in her study while she did without me for a couple of weeks at
the office. The hierarchy of our situation-she was, after all, the
judge and I the clerk-could not interfere with her caring for an-
other human being in need of help. She thrived on nourishing
others.
Her enthusiasm for literal nourishment was legendary. When
she was learning Chinese cooking, my husband and I frequently en-
joyed her multi-course feasts. I was constitutionally unable to eat as
much as theJudge, so I was dubbed the "food fink." I bowed to the
master, and marvelled that her enthusiasm for life equalled her en-
thusiasm for food. All her appetites were large, whether they were
for people, forjoy, for beauty, for music, for knowledge, or for food.
She experienced life's fullness and abundance.
The Judge saw herself as a perpetual learner. She was always
doubting, always questioning whether she was doing the right thing.
She even attributed her success in life to "miracles," not to her in-
telligence, wit, ability, or hard work. When we were reading cases,
her refrain was always "I don't understand." Everyone had some-
thing sensible to say, so her lack of understanding could not mean
the case didn't make sense; the reason had to be that she had not yet
2331985]
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discerned its meaning. Her need to understand and her capacity to
perceive and question assumptions, whether her own or another's,
were at the heart of her integrity. Integrity is a quality with many
definitional levels; all applied to the Judge.
Integrity encompasses honesty. The Judge displayed personal
honesty with herself and her friends. She never left one in doubt
regarding her opinions of one's conduct, although her opinions
were often cloaked in humor. I remember well how she teased me
about my first job after the clerkship. I became a supervisor in the
clinical program at American University before I had ever repre-
sented a client. Despite my fears about the job and my defensive-
ness about my lack of experience, she disarmed me with the
sincerity of her amusement. At another time, in a memorable
speech, she mused about gender discrimination. She remarked that
she was at a loss to understand why women were said to be bad
workers because of their hormone make-up. As she understood the
facts, the same hormones that may make women aggressive and un-
predictable once a month are running around in men's bodies every
day!
The intellectual honesty the Judge demanded of herself made it
impossible to label her politically. She was neither liberal nor con-
servative; she was deciding cases. The precedents would control her
decision once two criteria were met: She had to be sure she knew
what the precedents meant, and she had to be sure that they still fit
the requirements of social conditions. She understood the job of
the common law judge as finding ways to solve people's problems in
a real world. To do that, one needed cases to know what other
judges had said about the same kinds of problems when they tried
to solve them. At the most fundamental level, a common law judge
determines whether an earlier case decides the case at hand by com-
paring their facts. To Judge Davidson, this was a rigorous exercise
demanding exquisite care; the record was dissected and the evi-
dence examined, reexamined, and re-reexamined. The record
alone was inadequate for her purpose, however, since a judge in
1984 never saw the facts in the same context as a judge in 1884 or
1964. Whatever made the continually changing social context dif-
ferent also had to be examined. When she perceived differences
that were determinative, she would try to reformulate the rule of
law. Many would call this activist judging; to her, it was the heart of
the common law process.
Integrity also signifies the quality of completeness, the state of
being entirely whole. The Judge would have joined in an opinion
[VOL. 44:229234
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labelling her honest and full of character, but she would have dis-
sented from being labelled whole or complete. She felt she had too
much to learn, to experience, to understand, to accomplish. She
sought perfection and knew she would never achieve it. But whole-
ness and perfection are different, and it was her quest for perfection
that gave her wholeness. She knew her goal: She wanted to do
whatever she did in the best way she could. Rarely does one en-
counter a person whose life is both so focused and so appropriate to
her soul.
She was my mentor. In her abundance and enthusiasm, she
called me her "firstborn." And she made me feel as if that were
true. She offered her life for examination, but she never believed
others would or should repeat her experience. She knew the uni-
queness of each person's journey. Her own, full of compassion,
love, life, and integrity, ended too soon.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
JOHN J. DELANEY*
A serious review of the life of Rita C. Davidson would likely
focus upon her many achievements, or upon the principal attributes
of her unique character. Her major achievements, of course, in-
cluded her service in high public office, beginning as a member of
the governor's cabinet as Secretary of the Department of Employ-
ment and Social Services (now the Department of Human Re-
sources), continuing thereafter as Associate Judge of the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, and, from 1979 until her death, as As-
sociate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. She was the first
woman ever to serve in these offices. More importantly, she will be
remembered for the outstanding manner in which she discharged
her responsibilities in each of them. The hallmarks of Rita's charac-
ter included her interest and involvement in the political process;
her concern for the underprivileged; her commitment to reforming
law and public policy where necessary, in her view, to better serve
her fellow citizens; as well as her integrity, erudition, perseverance,
vision, and constant good humor in dealing with friend and foe
alike.
Any one of these achievements or attributes could itself be the
subject of lengthy reflection. However, in this tribute, I would like
to describe an often overlooked episode in Rita's life which both
epitomizes her spirit and exemplifies the meaningful and lasting
contributions she made to the commonweal during her all-too-brief
tenure among us. It concerns a land use dispute which ultimately
found its way to the Court of Appeals of Maryland and resulted in a
decision known as Hyson v. Montgomery County Council,' a landmark in
the fields of administrative and land use law. Ironically, Rita repre-
sented the losing appellants in Hyson. Yet, her legal arguments as to
the nature of the rezoning proceeding and the proper role of the
court in reviewing zoning decisions were fully embraced by the
court and resulted in a ruling that not only reformed the land use
regulatory process in Maryland, but had national implications as
well. The story is as follows.
Prior to Hyson, courts in most states adhered to the view that
the rezoning function, as performed by the local government legis-
lative body, was essentially legislative in character. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, while sharing this view, had indicated in a se-
ries of cases beginning in the early 1960s that the legislative charac-
* Partner, law firm of Linowes & Blocher, Silver Spring and Greenbelt, Maryland.
1. 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966).
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ter of the zoning decision did not preclude the local legislative body
from acting in an administrative or quasi-judicial capacity in hearing
a piecemeal rezoning case and in performing related functions prior
to reaching its decision.2 Nevertheless, uncertainty existed as to
whether and to what extent participants in rezoning proceedings
were entitled to procedural due process rights. It was through
Rita's efforts in Hyson that this uncertainty ended.
Hyson involved an application for commercial rezoning of a
four-acre tract in Montgomery County to accommodate a supermar-
ket. Rita, who was in private law practice at the time, represented a
number of citizens in opposing the rezoning. Her unsuccessful ef-
forts to cross-examine the applicant's witnesses at the public hear-
ing before the County Council formed the crux of the Hyson appeal.
The appeal was pursued with vintage Davidson thoroughness,
prompting the court to observe in the opening sentence of its opin-
ion: "Appellants, apparently in an effort to be certain they have
overlooked nothing that may aid them, have assigned 10 alleged er-
rors some of which overlap." 3
Hyson firmly established the principle that the zoning function,
as performed by the local legislative body, is not solely legislative in
character; that while the zoning decision itself may be legislative or
"quasi-legislative," the proceedings behind it, including the public
hearing, are adjudicatory in character; and that the legislative body
is performing a quasi-judicial function in determining adjudicative
facts in zoning proceedings. Thus, where the tribunal is required to
hold a public hearing and decide adjudicative facts based upon the
evidence of record, "a reasonable right of cross-examination must
be allowed the parties."4
Hyson in effect bifurcated the zoning function, and in so doing
may have also provided the most reasonable compromise yet de-
vised to facilitate judicial review of zoning decisions of local legisla-
tive bodies. Defining the appropriate role of the judiciary in such
cases has proven to be an elusive goal for courts around the coun-
try. Some, perceiving the zoning function to be purely legislative,
tend to restrict their role to a cursory review of the record and give
short shrift to the procedural due process claims of the parties.
Meaningful review of zoning actions in such courts often does not
occur. Other courts treat the entire zoning function (decision and
2. See, e.g., Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md.
187, 216 A.2d 149 (1966).
3. 242 Md. at 59, 217 A.2d at 581.
4. Id. at 67, 217 A.2d at 585.
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proceedings) as quasi-judicial, based upon the perceived inferior
status of the local legislative body. Their review, uninhibited by the
doctrine of separation of powers, can be so pervasive as to obliterate
stare decisis and make the court itself something of a super zoning
tribunal. 5
The Hyson approach, as advocated by Rita, successfully bridged
the gap between these two extremes. It leaves virtually undisturbed
the traditional "presumption of correctness" that attaches to chal-
lenged zoning decisions (based upon the separation of powers con-
cept embodied in the federal and Maryland constitutions), while
simultaneously recognizing that the court may intervene to protect
the procedural due process rights of parties to the proceeding. The
rule of Hyson has survived intact for nearly two decades.6 Whether
this is due more to the pragmatism of the decision or its ingenuity
remains to be debated.
The Hyson case is generally credited as having led to the estab-
lishment of the zoning hearing examiner system in Maryland. Mary-
land's zoning hearing examiner system has in turn become
something of a model for the nation and has been emulated in sev-
eral states. Here, too, Rita played a major role. She became the
first zoning hearing examiner in Montgomery County, serving in
this position from 1967 to 1970. Her written reports and recom-
mendations were of such a consistently high caliber as to become
the standard for her successors. FormerJudge Wilson K. Barnes of
the Court of Appeals once characterized Rita's reports in a highly
contested case as "perhaps the clearest and most comprehensive
analyses of all relevant zoning factors in regard to a subject property
I have yet seen." 7 She pioneered in establishing rules of practice
and procedure for zoning hearing examiners and assisted other ju-
risdictions in developing their own hearing examiner systems.
Maryland courts, in reviewing the actions of zoning bodies,
have accorded great weight to the recommendations of zoning hear-
ing examiners. While acknowledging the ultimate authority of local
legislative bodies in such matters, the courts have held that where
the legislative body's decision is contrary to the recommendation of
the hearing examiner, the decision must be based upon the legisla-
ture's own independent analysis of the evidence and must be sup-
5. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
6. The Hyson rationale has, however, encountered a storm cloud or two. See, e.g.,
Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 483 (1977).
7. Chapman v. Montgomery County Council, 259 Md. 641, 650, 271 A.2d 156, 161
(1970) (Barnes, J., dissenting).
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ported by its own specific written findings of basic facts and
conclusions of law.8 In actual fact, zoning bodies have followed the
recommendations of the hearing examiners in well over eighty per-
cent of the cases. This is because the record in a case involving a
hearing examiner is likely to be more fully developed and the deci-
sion more thoroughly considered. The end result has been a
marked decrease in court appeals in such cases.
Suffice it to say that the general public and the legal profession
are indebted to Rita Davidson for the Hyson ruling and all that it
spawned. However, her contributions to the field of land use law
did not end with Hyson. During her years as a member of the judici-
ary, she authored several important opinions on this subject.9 The
quality of her opinions was in keeping with the tradition of excel-
lence for which Maryland courts have long been known in land use
law.' °
As noted above, Rita actually lost the Hyson case. The court,
perhaps motivated by a desire that its ruling be prospective, con-
cluded that while Rita was correct on the law regarding the adjudica-
tory character of the zoning proceeding, it could find no denial in
the record of any specific request by her to cross-examine. Many
who were present at the hearing on that evening long ago would
respectfully disagree with the court on this point. Be that as it may,
Rita may have lost a battle, but with the Hyson ruling, she made an
important and lasting contribution toward improving the process by
which government regulates the use of land.
8. See, e.g., CharlesJ. Cirelli & Sons, Inc. v. Harford County Council, 26 Md. App.
491, 493-94, 338 A.2d 400, 401-02 (1975).
9. See, for example, Judge Davidson's opinions in Boyce v. Sembly, 25 Md. App.
43, 334 A.2d 137 (1975) and Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981).
10. Maryland has been recognized as one of four leading states in land use case law.
See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.02 (1974).
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JOHN C. ELDRIDGE*
Judge Rita C. Davidson was my colleague on the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland from her appointment in 1979 until her untimely
death on November 11, 1984. Throughout her legal career, Judge
Davidson committed herself to the needs of the people she believed
were underrepresented in government and strove to address what
she perceived as an imbalance between government and the individ-
ual. When Judge Irving A. Levine of the Court of Appeals died in
1978, Judge Davidson wrote that "[h]is opinions reflect his effort to
make certain that the individual is not crushed either by the large-
ness of the free marketplace or the vastness of the State. Worrying
incessantly about the plain, ordinary person struggling against enor-
mous societal forces, he worked to balance the scales so as to give
the individual a fair chance."' The words Judge Davidson wrote of
Judge Levine embody her view of the function of the public servant.
Judge Davidson's concern for the rights of individuals was man-
ifest in opinions she wrote for the Court in such criminal cases as
Powers v. State,2 Howell v. State,3 Scott v. State,4 and in the plurality
opinion in Foster v. State.5 Powers extended the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in criminal cases, holding that under certain circumstances
a retrial of the defendant on a count was precluded even though
there had been a hung jury with respect to that count. Judge David-
son's opinion in Howell reinforced an accused's constitutional right
to counsel, holding that an unrepresented defendant could not be
required to choose between the right to counsel and the statutory
right to be tried within 180 days. In Scott, Judge Davidson recog-
nized the particular unfairness to an accused in a death penalty sen-
tencing proceeding unless, "in the face of the unique severity of the
death penalty, the type of admissible evidence is more circum-
scribed than in a non-death penalty case."'6 Judge Davidson's Foster
opinion took the position that the exclusion, under the hearsay rule,
of relevant and sufficiently reliable exculpatory testimony deprived
the defendant of her federal constitutional right to present evidence
on her own behalf.
* Associate Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland.
1. 38 MD. L. REv. 137, 138 (1978).
2. 285 Md. 269, 401 A.2d 1031, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979).
3. 293 Md. 232, 443 A.2d 103 (1982).
4. 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983).
5. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 985
(1984).
6. 297 Md. at 252, 465 A.2d at 1135.
RITA C. DAVIDSON TRIBUTE
In some cases, however, Judge Davidson's advocacy of individ-
ual rights placed her in unpopular positions with large segments of
the public, as well as at odds with the majority of her colleagues on
the Court of Appeals. It is in her dissenting opinions that her com-
mitment to the individual is most apparent. For example, she vigor-
ously challenged all impositions of the death penalty. Judge
Davidson never voted to affirm a death sentence, often being the
lone dissenter. She also dissented from the Court's determination
that the Maryland State Police sobriety checkpoints did not violate
individual constitutional rights, commenting: "In balancing the so-
cietal interest in protection from drunk drivers against the individ-
ual interest in protection from unreasonable governmental action, I
can only conclude that in this case, the individual rights accorded by
the Constitution must prevail." 7
In her concern for individual rights, Judge Davidson often
seemed to have little tolerance for arguments against her positions
based on practical consequences. Some critics might say that if she
saw a flaw in the system which she preceived as causing injury to an
individual, she would not permit the flaw regardless of the effect
upon the system.' On the other hand, Judge Davidson firmly be-
lieved that consequential problems in the administration of the judi-
cial or executive branches of government furnished no ground for
what she viewed as compromising the rights of an individual
charged with a criminal offense.
Turning to civil cases, Judge Davidson was a strong champion
of providing an individual with effective redress for injuries. Thus,
she became one of the few judges in the country to urge recognition
of a cause of action for professional educational malpractice.9 And
in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education,'° Judge Davidson
dissented from the majority's refusal to abandon the doctrine of
contributory negligence as a bar to recovery in negligence cases.
She evidenced little patience for the Court's deference to the legis-
lature as the preferred source of change for this particular doctrine,
advocating instead a more activist approach. She labeled the con-
tributory negligence doctrine unfair and "a harsh and arbitrary rule
7. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 519, 479 A.2d 903, 920 (1984).
8. See, for example, Judge Davidson's dissenting opinions in State v. Frazier, 298
Md. 422,464, 470 A.2d 1269, 1291 (1984), and its progeny, and State v. Hicks, 285 Md.
310, 321, 403 A.2d 356, 362 (1979).
9. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 491, 439 A.2d 582, 587 (1982) (David-
son, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983)(Davidson, J., dissenting).
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because [of] its 'all or nothing' approach."'" Her activism was ap-
parent also in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Murphy v.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,' 2 in which she urged the abolition of the
common law distinction regarding the duties owed to persons prop-
erly on land (invitees and licensees) and the duty owed to
trespassers.
In other civil areas, however, Judge Davidson authored majority
opinions which have become recognized as leading expositions of
the law. Two marital property opinions, Harper v. Harper'3 and Grant
v. Zich, 14 are prime examples. In Harper, Judge Davidson applied a
statute embodying the "source of funds" theory of marital property.
Under this theory, "when property is acquired by an expenditure of
both nonmarital and marital property, the property is characterized
as part nonmarital and part marital."' 5 Zich, which was Judge David-
son's next to last majority opinion, held that the source of funds
theory contained in the marital property statute also applied to
property titled as tenants by the entirety, and that, for the purpose
of characterizing property as marital or nonmarital, the statute over-
turned the prior law that a presumption of gift arose from titling
property as tenants by the entirety.
Although Harper and Zich apparently brought Judge Davidson
some criticism from a few persons in the women's rights movement,
because of the decisions' perceived unfair effect on women, her
opinions in those cases simply applied the plain language of the
marital property statute. Actually, Judge Davidson's opinions re-
flected her vigorous opposition to distinctions in the law based on
sex. Thus, in Kline v. Ansell,' 6 the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge Davidson, held that because only a man could sue or be sued
in a common law action for criminal conversation, the cause of ac-
tion violated Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment and could not
"be reconciled with our commitment to equality of the sexes."' 7 In
Turner v. State,'8 Judge Davidson, writing for the Court, determined
that the so-called "Female Sitters Law," which made it illegal to em-
ploy a woman to circulate among patrons of an entertainment estab-
11. Id. at 465, 456 A.2d at 906.
12. 290 Md. 186, 196, 428 A.2d 459, 465 (1981) (Davidson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
13. 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982).
14. 300 Md. 256, 477 A.2d 1163 (1984).
15. 294 Md. at 80, 448 A.2d at 929.
16. 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980).
17. Id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933.
18. 299 Md. 565, 474 A.2d 1297 (1984).
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lishment and "produce sales" of food or beverages, violated the
Equal Rights Amendment because, under the statute, a man could
be employed as a "sitter" but a woman could not be so employed.
An area in which Judge Davidson's expertise has been particu-
larly recognized is administrative law. Maryland Commission on Human
Relations v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. "9 demonstrated her mastery of ad-
ministrative procedure and adeptness at interpreting federal and
state statutory provisions pertaining to administrative remedies.
One aspect of administrative law in which Judge Davidson's profi-
ciency was unchallenged was zoning. In Schultz v. Pritts,2° she devel-
oped, through exhaustive research and detailed reasoning, the
standard by which to judge special exemptions. She was able in this
and similar opinions to translate legal concepts in arcane areas of
the law into readable yet authoritative opinions.
Judge Davidson's majority and dissenting opinions influenced
and will continue to influence the course of the law in Maryland. My
colleagues and I shall miss her greatly.
19. 295 Md. 586, 457 A.2d 1146 (1983).
20. 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981).
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Rita C. Davidson was a Judge on the Court of Special Appeals
from November, 1972, until her appointment to the Court of Ap-
peals inJanuary, 1979. During the time judge Davidson served on
the Court of Special Appeals, she demonstrated repeatedly that she
was a person of large intellect and of great compassion for people. I
am certain that if there were anything good to be said of the worst of
people, Rita would say it.
While Judge Davidson was on this court, she was instrumental
in bringing about a material change in the court's philosophical ap-
proach to sixth amendment speedy trial rights. Her contribution to
that area of the law is without peer. Similarly, Judge Davidson made
a considerable imprint on the law of zoning. Her endeavors in that
field are renowned.
A major contribution to the law of Maryland was made by Judge
Davidson in an opinion she wrote while a member of this court: Bel
Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc.' In what the Court
of Appeals termed "a scholarly opinion, '"2 she traced the history of
arbitration in the United States and explained the Maryland Uni-
form Arbitration Act. Although the Court of Appeals reversed, on
other grounds,3 Rita's opinion serves as a lighted beacon to guide
lawyers and judges through the reefs of arbitration law. When she
became a judge on the Court of Appeals, Rita continued to pen
learned opinions on the subject of arbitration.4
During her years on the bench, Rita established in everyone's
mind that she was philosophically liberal, physically courageous,
and mentally persistent. Judge Davidson was a devoted public ser-
vant who did not fear to toss tradition and precedent to the winds
whenever she believed that being bound by those two legal precepts
restrained the rights of the people. Rita strove to make the law
serve what she believed were the best interests of society.
Following Rita's appointment to this court, she and I became
good friends. To be in her company was a delight. She was articu-
late, logical, and forceful, and she possessed a keen sense of humor.
* Chief Judge, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
1. 21 Md. App. 307, 320 A.2d 558 (1974).
2. Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 314,
334 A.2d 526, 530 (1975).
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc.,
294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Insurance Comm'r,
293 Md. 409, 445 A.2d 14 (1982).
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Rita was a person of many interests-the law, politics, government,
the arts, literature, and the Washington Redskins.
Whenever my thoughts focus on Rita, I recall the two occasions
on which my wife and I spent several days with Rita, her husband,
and her family at Cape Hatteras. One could not be with Rita very
long before discovering that, in addition to her other attributes,
Judge Rita Davidson was a devoted wife and mother. She was also
an excellent cook. Having partaken of some of her culinary cre-
ations, I am firmly convinced that had she not aspired to become a
judge, she would have been one of the world's most famous chefs.
The illness that claimed her life, and thereby caused untold sor-
row and pain to many, first occurred in 1975. Rita fought the dis-
ease with all her strength and will. She fought cancer just as she
fought other battles-with a determination to win. She gave no
quarter. Despite the pain and suffering she must have endured, she
continued to be Rita-cheerful, considerate, and compassionate.
That Rita loved life is reflected, I think, in her approach to the death
penalty. She firmly believed that life was too sacred to be taken by
the State as retribution.
Much laudatory language has been used since Rita's death to
describe her many deeds and accomplishments, yet she needed
none, for by her own acts she carved her permanent niche in Mary-
land history.
Rita is gone. Gone too is her friendly smile, her encouraging
words, and the warmth of her greeting: "Hello, my friend!"
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Exuberant. Vital. Compassionate. Courageous. Curious.
"First-ever." Professional. These are a few of the many adjectives
that could be used to describe Rita Davidson. She was an extraordi-
nary woman, a larger than life figure who transformed those whose
lives she touched.
I met Rita for the first time when I took a class of first-year law
students to see an argument in the Court of Appeals, as a prelude to
their own moot court arguments. Rita agreed to talk to the class
about what it was like to be a judge on a court of last resort.
Although I had heard much about Rita from my colleagues Oscar
Gray (a classmate of hers at Yale) and Ken Abraham, I was not pre-
pared for Rita in person. It was an extraordinary performance-an
evocation of the responsibility, frustration, and loneliness as well as
the exhilaration which she sometimes felt in that position. Her can-
dor captivated and astonished the class, and they would not let her
go.
That was typical of Rita. As I came to know her better over the
years, I realized that her enormous zest for life and her great con-
cern for others infused all that she did. But I don't want to give the
wrong impression. She was not your ordinary staid and sober lib-
eral. She loved life. She enjoyed, for example, the cocktail parties
given by the American Law Institute, taking great pleasure in intro-
ducing her many friends to one another. Rita was also good com-
pany, educated and full of bounce. Well I remember one dinner
David and she gave for some of us from Maryland. The dinner, su-
perbly done home Chinese cooking, was served by our kimono-clad
hosts; the conversation ranged from the current Supreme Court to
Montgomery County politics to recounting scurrilous stories of
graduates of the Yale Law School. (I was the only guest not a gradu-
ate of that sometimes-august institution.) Rita's playfulness also
manifested itself when she challenged Dean Kelly in one of the Law
School's annual debates over the relative virtues of the latke and the
hamantasch. Not only did she devour Mike,' but she had printed up
and distributed a paper full of news stories extolling the virtues of
the latke-an enterprise which must have occupied a good deal of
her time.
So far I have talked only of Rita, the person. That is the way I
Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. This, of course, was difficult because Mike Kelly, as everyone knows, is a "noted
Talmudic scholar."
246 [VOL. 44:229
RITA C. DAVIDSON TRIBUTE
remember her. Of course, she was more than that. She had a
splendid career before she ascended the bench and became Mary-
land's first female appellate judge. And what a judge she was.
Staunchly liberal, concerned about the rights of the poor and op-
pressed, Rita often was in the minority on a court usually a good bit
more conservative than she; she helped balance the court ideologi-
cally. Thus, her positions on the death penalty, on protecting the
rights of accused criminals, and on ensuring the widespread applica-
tion of Maryland's equal rights amendment were natural positions
for her to take. And her interest and expertise in administrative law,
gained in part through her years of service in state and local govern-
ment, were widely recognized.
Perhaps less widely recognized were the interest and expertise
she showed in tort law. This is an area where the Court of Appeals
has generally refused to follow the current trends of other jurisdic-
tions. Rita, however, actively sought to make Maryland tort law
more modern. In this she sometimes succeeded. When she won,
her opinions were definitive;2 when she lost, her dissents could be
devastating.3
What I remember most about Rita as a judge, however, is her
interest in her craft. Concern for proper judicial decision-making
techniques is a hobbyhorse of mine, so I am a little unbalanced in
talking about it. Nonetheless, I am astonished at how very few
judges are deeply interested in thinking and talking about how they
go about what their profession demands of them: construing stat-
utes, interpreting precedents, making new law. Rita was an all-too-
rare exception.
Rita also served a vital role, one in which I am sure she took
great pride, as a model for women lawyers and law students. She
was greatly admired among the women at the Law School, not only
for her accomplishments as pathfinder, but for her very real accom-
plishments at bar and bench. Rita's ability to perform her job at a
very high level while remaining a most human judge encouraged
women lawyers greatly. In recounting her many successes in life, it
should be remembered that this was far from the least of her
accomplishments.
It seems so unfair that one who loved life as much as Rita Da-
2. See, e.g., Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) (criminal conversa-
tion no longer a tort in Maryland); Stack v. Capital Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 293 Md.
528, 445 A.2d 1038, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982) (defamation).
3. See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d
894 (1983) (majority refused to adopt comparative negligence).
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vidson did, and who added so much to the world about her, should
die before her time. It would be wrong, however, to think of her life
as unfulfilled. As wife, mother, politician, judge, and friend she was
an extraordinary woman. Her accomplishments-personal and
professional-far exceeded those which most of us achieve within
our few precious years. Holmes once said that, "as life is action and
passion, it is required of a man that he should share the passion and
action of his time at peril of being judged not to have lived." Rita
easily met Holmes' standard. Let us not grieve, but praise and strive
to emulate.
RITA C. DAVIDSON TRIBUTE
PATRICIA M. WALD*
I would like to share a few memories of Rita Charmatz
Davidison-as a supportive classmate in law school, as a gritty wo-
man gaining a foothold in the legal profession in the fifties and six-
ties (before the feminist movement got underway); as a wife and
mother engaged in the acrobatics ofjob and family; as an indomita-
ble public servant determined to make government work for all the
people; as a tough-minded, soft-souled judge, refusing to be iso-
lated from the real world, dedicated to developing a set of rules by
which a whole society could live peaceably and justly.
We were an improbable lot, the ten women who entered Yale
Law School in 1948. We were shunted off-campus to a ramshackle
old dorm on Hillhouse Avenue, literally next to the railroad track.
Every night when the library closed at 10:00, we grabbed our books,
cajoled some companion-male or female-to accompany us home
through the darkened New Haven streets, and talked late into the
night of life, careers, men, and the law-usually in that order. At
exam time, we shared notes, food, kettles of coffee and, covertly,
copies of the Ladies Home Journal. We warded off overly exuber-
ant suitors, telephone breathers, the blues, and professors who liked
to call on the "girls" for a break in the classroom grind. I read
much now about how exploited we were then, how despairing we
should have been about our futures and the doors out there that
were closed to us. But, I'll file a dissent. We were outrageously up-
beat-we laughed a lot, joked about the faculty and our male col-
leagues, socialized normally (sometimes extravagantly) and believed
against all logical expectations that we would do just fine on
graduation.
Among us, Rita was most spectacularly defiant-sensing the ab-
surd, piercing pretentions, leaping for the dialectic jugular, rau-
cously challenging the pseudo-sophistication that permeated law
school. She laughed often and loud-I can hear her now in our "La-
dies Lounge," where we stored our books, clothes, secrets, and oc-
casional heartaches and refueled between classes for our forays into
a man's world. Rita was never an invisible woman; she was, even
then, a big person, operating on a grand scale. She met life head
on. When she entered the legal profession, it was on the same
terms.
I suppose, looking back, that the most improbable thing about
us was that we did not doubt for a moment we would make it, how-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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ever each of us defined that goal. We were confident, with the sure-
ness of inexperience, that we would somehow contribute to the
development of the law and, since we went to Yale, to public policy
as well. Naive, unaware, not yet exposed to the world's slights,.
in the end, most of us did make it, Rita heading the march.
Rita married Dave Davidson, a classmate, shortly before we
graduated. I married a classmate too, and for a time our lives sepa-
rated. When next I saw her, we were both suburban Maryland
housewives, mothers, and lawyers. Rita was pursuing simultane-
ously Dr. Spock, ward politics, zoning appeals, and the Stevenson
campaign. She was gearing up. For our generation of women it was
not a straight course-lots of detours, dead ends, false starts,
bruises, a few unlikely breaks. We built our own career ladders.
I remember one incident as typical of our manic lives then. My
husband and I were living in a cramped three room apartment; our
second child had just been born. We desperately needed a party
with our friends. Of course, at 4:00 on Saturday afternoon the baby
came down with a high fever. In a daze, we cancelled the party and
somehow forgot to call the Davidsons. They arrived, festivally una-
ware, to find me overwrought, the apartment a mess, a baby wailing,
a sister miserably neglected. Rita promptly took over, turning an
embarassment into a happening. She and Dave prepared the food,
my husband flooded us with martinis, I tended to the baby, the
Davidsons entertained our daughter, and after the doctor had come
and gone (yes, they made house calls in those days)-we had our
party. Much later, unresentfully, she told me her whole family had
come down with the same bug. In those days, we laughed a great
deal as an antedote against tears and persevered.
Over time, we heard much more about Rita Davidson as she
placed her indelible mark on Maryland. She was an indefatigable
campaigner for candidates and causes in which she believed. She
spellbound her audiences-her voice boomed, she rocked with
laughter, she joked one moment, sternly admonished the next. Suc-
cess was always certain. She handled the pols and followed the
polls, she knew when to conciliate and when to hold firm. One
night on the 6:00 news we watched Rita plead the unpopular cause
of welfare mothers in Maryland threatened with benefit cutoffs.
They had a champion. She wheedled, stomped, hollered in public
and patiently persuaded in private until she got what she wanted-
not for herself but for her constituency, the poor and the powerless.
She was a force not content to confine herself to the lecture hall and
the law reviews, though her intellect was a formidable one. She was
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on the barricades in the sixties and seventies-for women of course,
but for all the disadvantaged. She spoke their language, fought
their fights in the executive mansion, in the legislature, in the grass-
root precincts. Her hands were dirty; her soul was always pristine.
When the women's movement took off in the mid-seventies,
and women judges became more than tokens, it seemed inevitable
that Rita would go on the bench, and she did-first to the intermedi-
ate appellate court, then to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. I
remember the great adoring bash her friends threw for her when
she first ascended into that rarified atmosphere. I wondered if all
her zest, her uninhibited energies, her great enthusiasms, her defi-
ance of convention, could be channelled into mere oral arguments
and printed words. There was no need to worry; all the vital, hard,
searing human questions in the law came to Rita's court-the death
penalty, abortion, rights of abandoned spouses, interracial custody
fights, affirmative action, sex discrimination.
Sometimes hers was a solitary voice; she dissented often and
effectively. One of her last dissents challenged the imposition of the
death penalty on a seventeen year old.' I am told she did not hesi-
tate to button-hole colleagues, to argue and reargue her convic-
tions. She was not content to polish a phrase at the expense of
building a consensus. On the court as in the field, she shot the
moon. Withal, she lectured often to community groups, ran for re-
election to the court, developed a coterie of clerks and youthful ad-
mirers from Maryland's law schools, actively participated in the
Women's Bar and in the National Association of Women Judges.
Rita did more for the cause of state courts than a hundred symposia.
After the fact, I learned of her first bout with cancer. But she
looked great, talked great, increased the pace of her schedule, maxi-
mized in every way the eight years bonus of life she was given. She
performed her daughter's wedding ceremony, came to our thirtieth
law school reunion, and once again, long into the night, we remi-
nisced about the way we were. And then very quickly it was over,
characteristically for Rita without self-indulgence or self-pity. At
her funeral service, a vast gathering of friends and colleagues spilled
out of the sanctuary. In many ways it reminded me of the celebra-
tion when she became a judge, although I liked that one a lot better.
I counted at the service several of our band of ten women who en-
tered law school together more than thirty years ago. I heard by
1. See Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 437, 478 A.2d 1143, 1168 (1984) (Davidson,
J., dissenting).
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phone and letter from the rest. Our ranks had been irreparably
broken.
There are all kinds of pioneers; Rita was surely one. She knew
well the adage that "one act of injustice tilts the scales of the uni-
verse in the direction of evil." She spent her life tilting them back.
